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Abstract
Peer-to-peer trading in energy networks is expected to be exclusively conducted by the prosumers of the network with
negligible influence from the grid. This raises the critical question: how can enough prosumers be encouraged to participate
in peer-to-peer trading so as to make its operation sustainable and beneficial to the overall electricity network? To this end,
this paper proposes how a motivational psychology framework can be used effectively to design peer-to-peer energy trading to
increase user participation. To do so, first, the state-of-the-art of peer-to-peer energy trading literature is discussed by following
a systematic classification, and gaps in existing studies are identified. Second, a motivation psychology framework is introduced,
which consists of a number of motivational models that a prosumer needs to satisfy before being convinced to participate in
energy trading. Third, a game-theoretic peer-to-peer energy trading scheme is developed, its relevant properties are studied, and
it is shown that the coalition among different prosumers is a stable coalition. Fourth, through numerical case studies, it is shown
that the proposed model can reduce carbon emissions by 18.38% and 9.82% in a single day in Summer and Winter respectively
compared to a feed-in-tariff scheme. The proposed scheme is also shown to reduce the cost of energy up to 118 ¢ and 87 ¢ per
day in Summer and Winter respectively. Finally, how the outcomes of the scheme satisfy all the motivational psychology models
is discussed, which subsequently shows its potential to attract users to participate in energy trading.
Index Terms
Peer-to-peer, energy trading, motivation, prosumer participation, psychology, game theory.
NOMENCLATURE
n Index of each prosumer.
En,s Energy surplus of prosumer n.
En,d Energy deficiency of prosumer n.
Ns The set of sellers of energy.
Nb The set of buyers of energy.
ν The value of the coalition.
pg,s Selling price of the grid.
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1pg,b Buying price of the grid.
Es Difference between total surplus and total demand in the network.
Ed Negative value of Es.
ps Peer-to-peer selling price.
pb Peer-to-peer buying price.
CO2 Carbon dioxide.
DER Distributed energy resource.
FiT Feed-in Tariff.
P2P Peer-to-peer.
ISO Independent system operator.
CPS Central power station.
I. INTRODUCTION
Global warming and the resultant climate change has become an important global issue recently, and using environmentally
friendly technologies for the energy sector is recognized as a potential solution to this problem [1]. As such, there has been
a significant increase in adopting distributed energy resources (DERs) at the edge of the grid level [2], i.e., at the consumer
premises. For example, the global market for rooftop solar panels is forecast to be increased by 11% compared to its market
value in 2016 over the next five years. This increase will further be complemented by a rise of 3605 MW in the supply of
electricity from residential storage devices by 2025 [3].
The expected benefit of such widespread deployment of DERs, however, is contingent on the extensive participation of the
owners of these assets, i.e., the prosumers [4] in the electricity market. For this purpose, a number of strategies are being
used at present to engage DER owners into the electricity market. Examples of such strategies include direct method [5],
indirect method [4], and feed-in-tariff (FiT) [6] scheme. In the direct method, individual DER is controlled and managed by an
aggregator, whereas indirect methods refer to strategies in which a central authority sends a signal to the owners to influence
their consumption and generation decisions. Under a FiT, however, the engagement of prosumers is more unequivocal. That
is, the prosumers sell their excess electricity directly to the grid and buy electricity from the grid, if needed.
While different strategies have their own advantages depending on the application, the benefit to prosumers needs to be fully
realized for their sustainable engagement in the energy market. In other words, energy management techniques need to be
prosumer-centric and to encourage the extensive participation of prosumers by demonstrating the benefits of participation [7].
Otherwise, prosumers may decide to go off-grid bringing inefficient outcomes to both the grid and the prosumers [4]. Examples
of such cases can be found in [8] (failure of smart meter trial, which is used in direct and indirect methods) and [9]
(discontinuation of FiT).
Peer-to-peer (P2P) trading [10] has emerged as a new energy management paradigm that allows energy from one prosumer
to go to another prosumer without any direct influence of a central controller [11] and is expected to address the limitation
of existing techniques. In a P2P trading platform, a prosumer with the need of energy can take advantage of other prosumers
2within its community with energy surplus by buying the excess energy at a relatively cheaper rate [12]. On the other hand,
prosumers with excess energy can make more revenue compared to the FiT scheme by participating in P2P energy trading.
Due to the potential benefits, a large number of studies are conducted to explore the potential of P2P energy trading among
different prosumers. Details of these existing studies are provided in Section II. Further, a number of pilot projects are currently
being developed across the world, including the Brooklyn Microgrid in New York [13], Valley Housing Project in Fremantle,
Western Australia [14], and the Enerchain Project in Europe [15].
Most existing studies have contributed to the problem of devising energy trading algorithms [16], modeling the trading
price [17], incentivizing prosumers [18], maintaining network constraints [19], and designing business contracts between
different prosumers [20]. However, a key gap which has not been addressed is: how to design a prosumer-centric energy
trading between different peers1 within a community that will ensure their widespread and sustainable engagement in the
electricity market? This issue is particularly important due to the fact that P2P trading platform is a trustless system without
the presence of a central controller (such as a retailer) for coordinating the energy trading [21]. Therefore, encouraging
prosumers to trust and cooperate to trade their energy with one another could be significantly challenging.
To this end, the main innovation of this study lies in exploring how motivational psychology [22] can be exploited for
designing a P2P energy trading technique in order to bridge the gap between the research and development of P2P energy
trading by providing an insight into how prosumers can be motivated to participate. In doing so, we have made the following
contributions in this paper:
• A detailed overview of existing literature on P2P energy trading is provided following a systematic classification. This
would help the reader to understand the current state of research in P2P trading and how the proposed study contributes
to the relevant body of knowledge.
• Motivational psychology is identified as a new tool for designing energy trading. The paper provides a detailed introduction
to the concept, and shows how it can be exploited through its various motivational models to design P2P energy trading
schemes with a view to encourage extensive prosumer participation.
• A demonstration of the design process of a P2P energy trading scheme is provided using cooperative game theory. The
properties of the game are studied and the stability of the developed scheme is validated. Then, by comparing the properties
of the outcomes with that of motivational models, it is shown that the developed scheme satisfies all the properties of the
discussed motivational models and thus has the potential to enable widespread prosumer participation in the P2P trading.
• Finally, some numerical case studies are provided to corroborate the claim about the developed P2P trading scheme that
it satisfies the necessary motivational models.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the terms P2P trading and motivational psychology that are
extensively used in this paper are introduced. How the P2P trading can be designed through a motivational psychology based
coalition game is explained in Section III. Finally, some concluding remarks are drawn in Section IV.
1Hereinafter, peer and prosumer will be used interchangebly to refer to a prosumer in the manuscript.
3II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, a detailed overview of P2P energy network and motivational psychology is provided. The objective is to
present the readers with a clear understanding of how they could potentially be integrated together for designing a sustainable
prosumer-centric P2P energy trading scheme in the future.
A. P2P Energy Network
According to [23], a distributed network architecture can be called a P2P network, if the participants of the network share a
part of their own resources with one another. These shared resources are necessary to provide the service and content offered
by the network (for example, file sharing) and can be accessed by other peers directly, without passing intermediary entities.
Further, in a P2P network, any single arbitrary chosen entity can be removed from the network without having the network
suffering from any loss of network service. Now, in light of the idea outlined by [23], a P2P energy network can be defined
as follows:
Definition 1. A P2P energy network can be defined as a network, in which the members of the network can share a part of
their resources (for example, renewable energy and storage space) and information to attain certain energy-related objectives.
Example of such objectives include renewable energy usage maximization, electricity cost reduction, peak load shaving, and
network operation and investment cost minimization. Each member can be a provider, a receiver or both of the network resources
and can directly communicate with rest of the peers of the network without any intervention from third party controller. Further,
a new peer can be added to or an old peer can be removed from the network without altering the operational structure of the
system.
As shown in Fig. 1, a P2P energy network generally consists of two layers [13]: 1) a virtual energy trading layer and 2)
a physical energy transfer layer. The virtual energy trading layer essentially resembles a local electricity market, in which
participating peers of the network exchange necessary information to decide on the resource type, resource amount, and price
per unit of resource exchanged with one another. A virtual layer needs to be based on a secured information system (for
example, blockchain based architecture [21]) that provides equal access to each peer. In the virtual layer, the generation,
demand, and consumption data of a peer are transferred from its smart meter over a secured communication network based on
which buy and sell orders are created. Then, using the created orders, an appropriate market mechanism is used to facilitate
energy trading. Once all buy and sell orders from different peers are matched, the payment is carried out and the exchange of
energy takes place over the physical layer.
The physical energy transfer layer, on the other hand, is essentially a distribution grid, which is used for the physical
transfer of electricity between peers. This physical network can either be a traditional distribution network, which is provided
and maintained by an independent system operator (ISO) or be a separate physical microgrid distribution grid in conjunction
with the traditional grid. It is worth noting that the financial transaction between the peers in the virtual layer does not directly
control the physical delivery of electricity. In fact, the payment from a buyer to a seller is done to initiate the transfer of
seller’s renewable energy into the distribution grid.
4Exchange of electricity in the physical energy transfer layer
Prosumers and consumers
Trading of energy in the virtual energy trading layer
Information flow
Fig. 1: Demonstration of different layers in a typical P2P energy network.
Now, based on how different prosumers interact with one another over a P2P network for energy, the existing P2P energy
trading literature can be divided into three general categories.
1) Microgrid-to-Microgrid energy trading: P2P energy trading mechanisms that fall into this category mainly focus on
handling the mismatch between the supply and demand of energy within microgrids by improving the utilization of renewable
energy resources. Such mechanisms, on the one hand, reduce electricity bills for the participating microgrids in the P2P energy
trading [24]. It is possible to smooth power generations at the microgrid by regulating the power flow within the grid despite
the stochastic load demand [25]. Further, incorporating the aspect of security within P2P trading allows the proliferation of
distributed energy resources and flexible demands to realize a more resilient grid in both normal and emergency conditions [26].
One example of this type of study can be found in [27].
2) Intra-microgrid P2P energy trading: This category of energy trading techniques models the decision making process
of exchanging energy between prosumers within a microgrid. For instance, the authors in [28] introduces a new concept of
P2P trading based on multi-class energy management. Here, energy is treated as a heterogeneous product, based on attributes
of its source which are perceived by prosumers to have value, such as generation technology, location in the network and
the owner’s reputation. Existing studies under this category can further be divided into two kinds. The first kind of studies
deal with financial allocation based on renewable energy generation. For example, in [16], the authors propose a consensus
based approach to P2P trading with product differentiation. [17] proposes an energy sharing model with price based demand
response for peer-to-peer network within a microgrid. In [29], the authors propose an optimization model for battery systems in
a P2P energy trading market to optimize the use of rooftop solar generation. [19] proposes a methodology based on sensitivity
analysis to assess the impact of P2P transactions on the network and to guarantee an exchange of energy that does not violate
5TABLE I: Summary of different types of P2P energy trading scheme available in the literature.
Type of peer to peer 
trading
Microgrid-to-microgrid Intra-microgrid P2P Peer-to-microgrid
Graphical 
illustration
General focus of the 
study
Energy trading between different microgrids
to handle the mismatch between the supply
and demand of energy in each microgrid by
improving the utilization of their collective
renewable energy generation.
Modeling of the decision making process of
exchanging energy between prosumers within
a microgrid by coordinating their DERs to
mitigate the intermittency of renewable
generation within the microgrid.
Long-term planning of connected
industrial microgrids by coupling the
decision of long-term investments and
short-term operations.
References [24], [25], [26], [27] [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [28], [29], [31], [32] [33]
network constraints. A similar kind of P2P energy trading between smart homes is proposed in [30]. The second type of
studies, on the other hand, focus on incentivizing prosumers for coordinated scheduling of flexible loads and energy storage.
Examples of such studies can be found in [20], [31] and [18]. In [20], the authors introduce real-time and forward markets,
consisting of energy contracts offered between generators with fuel-based sources, for incentivizing coordination between the
owners of large-scale and small-scale energy resources at different levels of the power system. An evolutionary game-theoretic
approach and a Stackelberg game are used in [31] for modeling the dynamics of buyers and seller to capture their interactions
in a P2P energy network. Finally, [18] develops a cooperative game theoretic approach for incentivizing prosumers to form
coalitions for P2P trading. A detail overview of different P2P energy market models can also be found in [32].
3) Peer to microgrid energy trading: An interesting concept of energy exchange between peer and microgrid is studied in
[33]. The objective is the long-term planning of the peer connected industrial microgrids by coupling the decision of long-term
investments and short-term operations via two game theoretical frameworks that allow the modeling of the different, even
conflicting, objectives of the stakeholders. The developed tool is tested on a virtual industrial microgrid to present the technical
and economic outputs. Other than above-mentioned categories, which are summarized in Table I, the application of P2P trading
is also found in managing energy for electric vehicles, e.g., see [34] and [35].
Based on the above discussion, clearly, the interaction and cooperation between peers within energy networks are critical for
the successful conductance of P2P trading. Therefore, it is critical that the prosumers participate in the trading process. However,
to enable this participation, P2P energy trading mechanisms need to possess some qualities that motivate the prosumers to
engage in the trading. To this end, how a motivational psychology framework can be used to motivate prosumers to participate
in P2P trading is discussed in the following section.
6B. Motivational Psychology
Motivation is a cognitive process that establishes reasons for human behavior [36]. Motivational psychology is a branch of
behavioral science that studies the psychological process, which regulates a human’s behavior based on his perspective, belief,
and opinion towards an action [37]. For example, according to [38], the design of a user interface can significantly impact
human psychology and subsequently affect the trading of goods in a cyberstore. The application of motivational psychology can
be found in public health [39], education system [40], human service [41], economics [42], medicine [43], engineering [44],
and energy management [45].
1) Change of human behavior: According to the stages of change model [46], the change in human behavior towards taking
an action, for example, in this case, participating in P2P trading, does not change abruptly. Rather, a person needs to go through
a series of multiple behavioral stages. In stage 1, a person is unfamiliar with the potential benefit of participating in P2P energy
trading. Subsequently, they are unwilling to change their behavior towards participating in P2P trading in the foreseeable future,
e.g., six months [47]. In stage 2, the person becomes aware of the benefit of participating in P2P trading and acknowledges
the potential drawback that may arise from not participating. He becomes interested to learn more about P2P trading and its
potential economic and environmental benefits. Nonetheless, he may still be not committed to actual participation [48].
In stage 3, the person becomes convinced of the potential environmental, social, and economic benefit that P2P trading can
bring and becomes ready to participate in P2P energy trading and plans to take necessary actions [48]. In stage 4, the person
starts participating in P2P trading [47] for the first time and thus becomes a part of sustainable energy practice. Finally, when
he reaches the stage 5, he continues working towards sustaining his behavioral change [47]. In other words, the individual
continuously participates in P2P trading with other prosumers of the network. An overview of these different motivational
stages is shown in Fig. 2.
However, a key challenge is to enable an individual (or prosumer) to pass through these motivational stages in order to
ensure his sustainable participation in P2P trading. As such, a number of motivational models are proposed in the literature as
detailed in the next section.
2) Models to motivate prosumers towards sustainability: Based on the discussion in the previous section, clearly, a successful
P2P trading platform requires a large number of Stage 5 prosumers. From this perspective, there are a number of motivational
psychology models that can be used to study how to influence prosumers to continue their participation in P2P trading.
Examples of such models include attitude model, rational-economic model, information model, elaboration likelihood model,
and positive reinforcement model.
a) Attitude model: According to this model, the environmental friendly behavior of a person is automatically influenced
by his favorable attitude towards the environment [49]. In other words, if a prosumer is convinced of the fact that participating
in P2P trading will benefit the environment, he will participate. Nevertheless, such positive attitude can also be affected by the
user’s view on privacy [50] and his sense of contribution towards environmental sustainability [51].
b) Rational-economic model: This model establishes that economic benefit significantly affects people’s pro-environmental
decision [49]. In other words, monetary cost and revenue resulting from participating in P2P trading can effectively motivate
people to be responsible and take necessary actions to participate in P2P trading.
7Stage 1: A person is unaware and uninformed of the advantages 
of participating in peer to peer energy trading
Stage 2: A person becomes aware of the benefit and 
acknowledges the potential drawback that may arise for not 
participation.
Stage 3: A person commits to participate in peer to peer energy 
trading and prepares his plan of actions.
Stage 4: A person starts participating in peer to peer trading.
Stage 5: A person continues to participate in peer to peer trading.
Fig. 2: Summary of different stages that a prosumer needs to pass through before agreeing to continue participating in P2P trading.
c) Information model: According to the information model, if a person is informed about a problem and the implication
of the solution, he would come forward and take appropriate measures to find a solution [49]. Moreover, information on other
relevant aspects of the issue such as privacy, environmental sustainability, cost, and revenue can also motivate an individual to
be proactive about engaging in taking necessary action [52].
d) Elaboration likelihood model: According to this model, there are two paths of communicating with and motivating
people: the central path and the peripheral path [53]. The central path is assumed to be appropriate for motivation when an
individual cares about the issue and has access to the information with a minimum of distraction. However, he may potentially
move away from the advocated position if the subject rehearses unfavorable thoughts due to the ambiguity of the message.
In this case, the peripheral path is more suitable that tries to associate the advocated position with things the receiver already
thinks positively towards (e.g., monetary benefit), using an expert appeal.
e) Positive reinforcement model: A positive reinforcement essentially refers to the case when an individual’s response to
a situation is followed by a reinforcing stimulus that increases the possibility of having the same response from him when a
similar situation occurs [36]. For example, receiving a considerable monetary benefit by participating in P2P energy trading
can positively reinforce a user to participate again in the future.
Now, based on the above discussion and their summaries in Fig. 2 and Fig 3, it is reasonable to say that it could be possible
to enable widespread participation of prosumers in P2P trading if the trading mechanism can be developed in such a way that
the outcome of participation satisfies the relevant motivational models. From this perspective, what follows is an overview of
a P2P energy trading technique, which is developed to support the motivational psychology models outlined in this section.
8Attitude Model: The environmental friendly behavior of a person 
is automatically influenced by his favorable attitude towards the 
environment
Rational-Economic Model: Economic benefit significantly affects 
people's pro-environmental decision.
Positive Reinforcement Model: The possibility of having a 
person’s similar response to a situation increases with the 
possibility of having the same outcome.
Information Model: When a person is informed about a problem 
and possible solutions, he would come forward to solve it.
Elaboration Likelihood Method: Communicating with and 
motivating people can be done via the central path (the message 
is clear) or the peripheral path (the message is unclear).
Fig. 3: Summary of the motivational models that needs to be supported by the P2P energy trading scheme to encourage widespread
participation of prosumers.
III. OVERVIEW OF A MOTIVATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY SUPPORTED P2P ENERGY TRADING
To discuss how to develop a P2P energy trading technique whose outcome may satisfy the motivational psychology models,
consider a very simple scenario, in which a number of households in a community are connected to the grid via grid-connected
solar system without battery [54]. In general, these households participate in energy trading with the grid through a FiT
scheme [6]. However, once the households are connected to a P2P network, they begin to interact with one another as peers
of the network to exchange electricity [13]. Nonetheless, each household may also interact with the grid if there is an energy
surplus or deficiency after completing P2P trading. An illustration of the FiT and the P2P energy trading scheme is shown in
Fig. 4. Now, due to the interactive nature of the energy trading process, a game theoretic approach is used to develop the P2P
trading scheme in this section.
A. Brief introduction to game theory
Game theory is a mathematical tool that analyzes strategies of competitive situations where the outcome of a player’s action
depends on the actions of other players [55]. Game theory can be broadly divided into two types: 1) non-cooperative game
and 2) cooperative game.
1) Non-cooperative game: A non-cooperative game deals with the strategic decision-making process of a number of
independent players that have totally or partially conflicting interest over the outcome of a decision that is affected by their
choice of actions. Now, if the players act only once, either simultaneously or at different points in time, the game is called a
static non-cooperative game. In a dynamic game, on the other hand, players act more than once and have more information
regarding the choice of other players. Further, time plays a central role in the decision-making process of each player in a
dynamic game.
9Household with rooftop 
solar panel without 
battery
Exchange 
of electricity 
via FiT
Main grid
Exchange 
of electricity 
via P2P
Fig. 4: This figure illustrates an example scenario in which a number of households participate in the P2P energy trading and/or the FiT
scheme.
The most popular solution concept of the non-cooperative game is the Nash equilibrium. Essentially, the Nash equilibrium
can be defined as a vector of actions that leads a non-cooperative game to reach a stable state, in which no player can be
better paid off by unilaterally deviating from its Nash equilibrium action when the actions of other players are according to
the Nash equilibrium.
2) Cooperative game: A cooperative game focuses on how one can provide incentives to independent decision makers so
that they act together as one entity in order to improve their position (or utility) in the game. In particular, it studies the
terms and conditions under which a number of players may agree to form a coalition (Nash bargaining) and the formation of
coalitions (coalition game) [11]. There are three categories of coalition games.
1) Canonical coalition game that studies the properties and stability of the grand coalition, the gains resulting from the
coalition, and how to distribute these gains in a fair manner to the players. The most renowned solution concept for the
coalitional game is the core, which is directly related to the stability of the grand coalition.
2) Coalition formation game, which studies the formation of a coalition structure through players’ interaction, and then
studies the properties of the structure and its adaptability to environmental variations.
3) Coalition graph game deals with such connectivity of communications between players with the main objectives to derive
low complexity distributed algorithms for players that wish to build a network graph and to study the properties such as
stability and efficiency of the formed network graph.
B. P2P energy trading scheme
To design a P2P energy trading scheme, the framework of a canonical coalition game is used. The choice of this game is
motivated by the following factor: P2P trading necessitates the prosumers to rely on each other for trading electricity. Thus, it
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can be seen as a group of households working together to achieve both global (e.g., reducing CO2 emission) and local (e.g.,
reducing the cost of electricity) objectives. As such, by studying the properties and stability of such a group, it would be
possible to comment on whether the participating households can form a stable coalition with each other, which subsequently
answers the question of whether the household finds it beneficial for them to remain in the coalition in order to participate in
P2P trading.
1) Stability of a coalition: The stability of a canonical coalition game refers to the fact that the grand coalition2 is stable.
That means once the grand coalition of prosumers is formed for P2P trading, no prosumer will have an incentive to leave
the grand coalition for further improving its benefit. Mathematically, a grand coalition is stable if 1) it has a non-empty core,
which is a vector of revenue allocation that ensures that each prosumer that forms a coalition with other prosumers for trading
energy receives a revenue such that it has no incentive to leave the grand coalition [56], and 2) the revenue that each prosumer
will achieve for participating in P2P trading always lie within the core [56].
Definition 2. From a coalition game perspective, peer-to-peer energy trading between the prosumers will be stable if:
• The game possesses a non-empty core, that is, the value function of the coalition needs to be superadditive. For the
definition of core and superadditivity, please see [56].
• The P2P energy trading price needs to ensure that the revenue that each prosumer may attain lies within the core [56].
In other words, the P2P trading price needs to always encourage the prosumers to participate.
2) Development of the trading scheme: To use a canonical coalition game with the above properties for designing a P2P
trading scheme, it is assumed that a number of prosumers with rooftop solar panels (without batteries) are connected to a
central power station (CPS). They are also connected to each other through a secure information system via their smart meters
for all necessary communication and transactions of P2P trading. At any particular time, each prosumer n has a particular
amount of electricity surplus En,s from the supply from its solar panel and deficiency En,d. If the prosumer has any surplus,
i.e., En,s > 0, it sells it to meet the demand of other peers as the first priority and then to the CPS, if needed. Similarly, if
there is any electricity deficiency, i.e., En,d > 0, a prosumer first buys the necessary amount from the peers within the network
and then from the CPS, if required. Thus, in a P2P trading, all the prosumers cooperate with one another to trade the surplus
energy among themselves as a first priority, and then interact with the grid, if necessary, to sell or buy the total excess or
deficient energy respectively.
Now, to enable such a trading of electricity, a canonical coalition game Γ = (Ns ∪Nb, ν) is considered. Here, Ns and
Nb are the sets of sellers and buyers of electricity respectively within the P2P network and ν is the value of coalition [56],
which, in this case, refers to the monetary benefit that prosumers, as a coalition group, may achieve for participating in P2P
trading. The monetary benefit ν to the group of prosumers can be viewed as the difference between revenue and cost, i.e.,
ν = pg,b[Es]
+ − pg,s[Ed]
+, where Es =
∑
n∈Ns
En,s −
∑
n∈Nb
En,d, Ed = −Es, [·]
+ = max(0, ·), and pg,s and pg,b are
respectively selling and buying prices by the grid. Indeed, the value function ν is a concave function and superadditive.
Now, note that pg,s > pg,b [12], which is due to the fact that retailers pay prosumers less for their excess generation, since
2The coalition of all prosumers in the network.
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Fig. 5: This figure illustrates how the mid market rate pricing scheme sets the P2P buying and selling price always within the range [pg,b, pg,s].
The value of pg,b and pg,s are chosen according to the electricity price in Brisbane, Australia.
it is considered non-dispatchable. Therefore, a suitable P2P trading price can potentially motivate the prosumers to cooperate
with one another in order to trade electricity among themselves, if possible, instead of trading with the CPS. To this end, the
mid market rate [57] is proposed to use as the pricing mechanism for this coalition game based P2P trading.
3) Setting trading price through mid-market rate: In mid-market rate, price of energy trading is set based on three
scenarios [57]. They are explained as follows.
a) Scenario 1 (Es = 0, Ed = 0): This scenario refers to the case when the total available surplus energy of the prosumers
is equal to their demand. In other words, prosumers, if participate in P2P trading, do not need to trade any electricity with the
CPS. According to mid market rate, the P2P trading price (both selling ps and buying price pb) is ps = pb =
pg,s+pg,b
2
.
b) Scenario 2 (Es > 0): This scenario refers to the case when the total available surplus energy of the prosumers is
greater than the total demand. In other words, prosumers, if participate in P2P trading, can not only meet the demand of
prosumers with energy deficiency, but can also sell a part of it to the CPS. Now, according to mid market rate, the P2P trading
price buying price pb is as same as that in scenario 1. However, due to selling to the CPS, the P2P selling price ps per unit
of electricity becomes ps =
pb
∑
n∈Nb
En,d+pg,bEs
∑
n∈Ns
En,s
.
c) Scenario 3 (Ed > 0): This scenario refers to the case when the total available surplus energy of the prosumers is
smaller than the total demand. In other words, prosumers, if participate in P2P trading, cannot meet the demand of prosumers
with energy deficiency and therefore need to buy excess energy from the CPS. In this scenario, the P2P buying and selling
prices become pb =
ps
∑
n∈Ns
En,s+pg,sEd∑
n∈Nb
En,d
and ps =
pg,s+pg,b
2
respectively.
Now, based on the above discussion and Definition 2, it can be concluded that the developed P2P trading scheme ensures
a stable coalition among the participating prosumers due to following reasons.
• The value function ν is concave and superadditive. Therefore, the canonical coalition game has a non-empty core by
following [58].
• The mid market rate is used for the P2P pricing. Evidently, as shown in Fig. 5, using mid market rate always allows
prosumers to buy energy from other prosumers with energy surplus as a price pb that is lower than the grid’s selling price
12
pg,s per unit of electricity. On the other hand, by participating in the P2P trading, prosumers with energy surplus can sell
their energy to other prosumers at a price ps > pg,b. This pricing ensures that the revenue distribution that each prosumer
achieve for participating in P2P trading lies within the core of the game.
Therefore, prosumers will be interested to cooperate with one another to participate in P2P trading.
Remark 1. Here, it is important to note that the discussion in Table II only emphsizes cost and CO2 reduction, but not
other objectives of P2P trading as outlined in Definition 1. This is due to the fact that the study focuses on the benefit to
the prosumers in order to encourage them to participate in the trading by satisfying a number of motivational models and
these two objectives are relevant for that purpose (other objectives are relevant to the grid). Of course, increasing the use of
renewable energy is also important for the prosumers. However, CO2 reduction is the result of using renewable energy and
therefore this aspect is not discussed separately.
Now, how the stable P2P trading scheme satisfies the motivational psychology models explained in Section II-B will be
discussed in the following section.
C. How the proposed energy trading scheme can psychologically motivate prosumers
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Fig. 6: This figure shows the solar data used in this paper for simulation.
To show how the proposed P2P trading scheme supports the motivational psychology framework, first, we present a number of
results based on the game theoretic scheme in this paper. Then, we will show the relevance of the results to different motivational
psychology models to demonstrate how the proposed scheme exhibits the properties of attracting users to participate in energy
trading. Publicly available real-data on solar generation3 and household energy demand of residential consumers4 are used
in the numerical simulation of the designed P2P trading scheme was used. A demonstration of solar data of a selected day
that is used in this paper is shown in Fig. 6. For each residential consumer, it was assumed that they were equipped with a
3kWp solar panel and 15 minute resolution data was used. The data used for this case study was recorded in December 2013.
The values for the grid’s buying price and FiT price were assumed to be 24.6 and 10 ¢/kWh respectively (these values are
referenced to the electricity price in Brisbane, Australia as an example). Furthermore, to calculate the production of CO2 from
3Public solar data is collected from IEEE PES ISS website.
4Residential data was taken from the website of National Energy Efficiency Alliance (NEEA).
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fossil fuel based generation, it was assumed that the power stations are driven by natural gas that produces a carbon footprint
of 0.55 Kg per kWh [45].
The results are compared with an FiT scheme to show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme. The comparison with an
FiT scheme is chosen intentionally due to the relevance of FiT with P2P trading in engaging customer with grid-tie solar
system without storage to trade their energy. Of course, there are schemes, other than FiT, that can also be used for renewable
energy management, such as a grid-tie-solar system with storage. However, since the developed P2P trading scheme assumed
a grid-tie system without storage, comparing with a solar system with storage is not valid. Furthermore, although grid-tie-solar
systems with storages can be found in households in the recent time, such setups are expensive due to the cost of the battery,
procurement of the battery, high battery degradation cost, and has a very long payback period [59]. Therefore, there is unlikely
to have extensive uptakes of battery storage by households in the near future.
TABLE II: This table demonstrates how much prosumers can save, compared to an FiT scheme, by participating in P2P energy trading.
Prosumer Cost savings in Summer (¢) Cost savings in Winter (¢)
1 63.55 42.61
2 61.19 34.25
3 100.78 63.92
4 118.73 86.96
5 101.23 61.50
In Table II, we consider five prosumers participating in P2P trading and show how much they can save by taking part in
P2P trading with one another. In particular, we show how much each prosumer can save compared to an FiT scheme for
participating in P2P trading in summer and winter. As shown in Table II, by participating in the proposed P2P trading scheme,
prosumers can always save money compared to what they could save by trading via the FiT scheme. Since the total sunshine
duration is longer and the intensity of sunlight is higher in Summer compared to Winter, the amount of solar production is
also higher in Summer. Consequently, the prosumers can save more in Summer than Winter.
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Fig. 7: Demonstration of the amount of CO2 production in a single day.
The variation in sunshine hours and the sunlight intensity between Summer and Winter also affect the production of CO2
in these two seasons, which is shown in Fig. 7. Of course, under the P2P and FiT scheme the total amount of renewable
generation is the same. However, under the P2P scheme, prosumers are directly aware of the amount of renewable energy
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they are obtaining from other prosumers, whereas, under the FiT scheme, each prosumer is only aware of their own individual
renewable generation. This affects the production of CO2 within the selected community as shown in Fig. 7. According to
Fig. 7,
• The generation of CO2 for both P2P and FiT schemes are higher in Winter compared to that in Summer. This is mainly
due to the longer sunshine hours and higher solar intensity in Summer.
• During the times outside sunshine hours, the production of CO2 is same in both P2P and FiT schemes. Since, no storage
is considered in the system, the proposed P2P scheme cannot perform better than the FiT scheme when there is no sun.
During sunshine hours, however, P2P shows considerable performance improvement in terms of CO2 production compared
to the FiT.
• Energy trading via the proposed P2P trading technique exhibits lower amount of CO2 production in both Summer and
Winter, compared to those for FiT scheme. This is due to the fact that in the FiT scheme, as considered in this study, a
prosumer buys its deficient energy from the grid and the grid burns fossil5 fuel to produce that energy. Under P2P trading,
the deficient energy of any prosumer is first met by the surplus energy from another peer of the network and a prosumer
only consume from the grid if there is no surplus left in the overall peer-to-peer network. Therefore, the demand to the
grid is lower in P2P scheme, which subsequently results in lower CO2 production. For example, in Summer and Winter,
the proposed P2P scheme demonstrates 18.38% and 9.82% reduction in CO2 production respectively in comparison to
the FiT scheme.
TABLE III: This table demonstrate the environmental and economic benefits of the developed P2P energy trading for different days in a
week.
Days in a week
Reduction in total production of CO2 Reduction in average cost per prosumer
CO2 production in 
kg (FiT)
CO2 production in 
kg (P2P)
% savings in CO2
Cost of energy in 
cents (FiT)
Cost of energy in 
cents (P2P)
% savings in cost
Day-1 109.98 92.03 16.32% 914.96 852.82 6.8%
Day-2 115.85 99.77 13.87% 974.04 909.51 6.6%
Day-3 152.14 136.59 10.21% 1299.50 1218.00 6.3%
Day-4 163.51 149.24 8.72% 1405.40 1332.40 5.2%
Day-5 188.65 176.35 6.52% 1636.70 1571.80 4%
Day-6 172.96 155.56 10.06% 1478.30 1387.40 6.1%
Day-7 189.58 177.45 6.40% 1645.50 1581.70 3.9%
It is important to note such benefits of reduction in cost and CO2 production of the P2P scheme over the FiT scheme always
hold true. For example, in Table III, we show the average reduction in CO2 production and cost of energy per prosumer
for seven consecutive days in Winter. We do not show this result for the Summer, as Summer demonstrates even a better
performance. According to this table, whenever prosumers choose to trade their energy by using the proposed P2P trading, it
benefits them, in terms of average cost reduction as well as the alleviation of average CO2 production. Thus, based on the
results from Table II, Fig. 7 and Table III, the proposed P2P energy trading model satisfies all the discussed motivational
models as explained below.
5It is assumed that the grid does not use any renewable energy to meet the demand of prosumers.
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• Attitude model: The outcomes of the P2P trading supports the attitude model. This is due to the fact that the designed
scheme demonstrates a consistent performance in reducing CO2 production (Fig. 7 and Table III), which has the potential
to convinced prosumers who are environmentally friendly to participate in P2P trading. Thus, the P2P trading platform
can help make prosumers aware of the amount of CO2 reduction their PV panels are helping to provide. This outcome
can motivate prosumers of all motivational stages.
• Rational economic model: In Table III, a clear benefit of P2P trading in reducing average cost of energy per prosumer is
demonstrated, which are 6.8%, 6.6%, 6.3%, 5.2%, 4%, 6.1%, and 3.9% reduction compared to a FiT scheme at different
different days of the selected. Similar results are also shown in Table II. Consequently, the proposed P2P energy trading
scheme satisfies the rational economic model and can be helpful for prosumers at Stage 2, Stage 3, and Stage 4.
• Information model: By providing the prosumers with useful information of the environmental benefit and economical
profit that can be obtained by P2P trading, they can be encouraged to participate, which subsequently complies with the
information model. This information can helpful to engage prosumers who are at Stage 1 and Stage 2.
• Elaboration likelihood model: While the technical detail of how the P2P trading can be done at household levels is difficult
to convey to general prosumers, the benefits such as reduction of electricity bills and environmental sustainability can be
easily exploited to convince prosumers of the importance of their participation in the trading process. Note that these are
some benefits that prosumers really care about and thus such communication following a peripheral path can help users
to be an integral part of P2P trading. This is relevant to the Stage 2 prosumers.
• Positive reinforcement model: A brief look at the performance of the developed P2P energy trading scheme as demonstrated
in Table III emphaizes that its performance is consistent and it continuously help prosumers to reduce their electricity cost
and CO2 emission whenever they participate in P2P trading. Thus, based on the definition explained in Section II-B, the
proposed trading scheme satisfies the positive reinforcement model and help prosumers to reach and continue as Stage 5
participants of the P2P trading.
Accordingly, based on the above discussion, which is also summarized in Table IV, it is reasonable to assume that the proposed
canonical coalition based P2P trading scheme has the potential to enable the extensive participation of prosumers in P2P trading.
In fact, as the participation of prosumers increases, the overall benefits also increase.
For example, in Table V, we show how the number of prosumers that participate in the P2P trading affects the total reduction
in energy cost and CO2 production within the network. To do so, we increase the number of prosumers in the considered
system from 5 to 25, calculate the reduction in total cost and CO2 production compared to the FiT scheme, and then list in
Table V. As can be seen in the table, while the trend of change in the cost and CO2 production across different seasons remain
as same as the results previously shown in Table II and Fig. 7, the increase in the number of participating prosumers in the
energy trading clearly improve the performance of the overall system. For instance, as the number of prosumers within the
network increases from 5 to 25, we observe a steady increase in the reduction in total cost from $4.45 to $26.07 in Summer
and from $2.89 to $15.63 in Winter. Similar steady increase in total reduction in CO2 production, compared to the FiT scheme,
is also demonstrated for both seasons.
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TABLE IV: Summary of how the developed canonical coalition game based peer-to-peer energy trading model satisfy motivational psychology
models. A brief discussion of the models can be found in Section II-B.
Models
Relevant stage
of prosumers
How the property holds?
Supporting out-
comes
References
Attitude model
Stage 1, 2, 3, 4,
5
The designed scheme demonstrates a consistent performance
in reducing CO2 production in each day of the selected week.
Fig. 7 & Ta-
ble III
[45], [50]
Rational
economic
model
Stage 2, 3, 4
A clear benefit of peer-to-peer trading in reducing average
cost of energy per prosumer is demonstrated, which are 6.8%,
6.6%, 6.3%, 5.2%, 4%, 6.1%, and 3.9% reduction compared
to a FiT scheme at different different days of the selected.
Table II & Ta-
ble III
[45], [49]
Information
model
Stage 1, 2
It provides the prosumers with useful information of the envi-
ronmental benefit and economical profit that can be obtained
by peer-to-peer trading, they can be encouraged to participate.
Table II, Ta-
ble III & Fig. 7
[45], [49], [52]
Elaboration
likelihood
model
Stage 2
The proposed scheme uses a peripheral path to help users to
understand the benefits of peer-to-peer trading.
Table II, Ta-
ble III & Fig. 7
[53]
Positive
reinforcement
Stage 5
The performance of the peer-to-peer trading model is con-
sistent, which continuously helps prosumers to reduce their
electricity cost and CO2 emission whenever they participate
in the peer-to-peer trading.
Table III [36], [45]
TABLE V: This table demonstrates how much prosumers can save, compared to an FiT scheme, by participating in P2P energy trading.
Total
prosumer
Total cost savings in $
(Summer)
Cost savings in $
(Winter)
Total CO2 savings in
kg (Summer)
Total CO2 savings in
kg (Winter)
5 4.45 2.89 16.88 10.96
10 8.85 6.06 33.54 23
15 17.59 10.6 66.69 40.18
20 22.27 13.34 84.21 50.60
25 26.07 15.63 98.81 59.24
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a motivational psychology framework has been introduced for peer-to-peer energy trading with an objective to
improve the participation of prosumers. First, preliminaries of peer-to-peer trading have been provided via suitable classification
of the state-of-the-art literature. Then, a motivational psychology framework has been introduced detailing different motivational
stages. Further, it has been demonstrated how a peer-to-peer trading scheme under the framework of motivational psychology
can be designed. For this purpose, a canonical coalition game has been used to develop the peer-to-peer trading scheme. Then,
with suitable numerical case studies, how the outcomes of the developed peer-to-peer trading scheme satisfy the introduced
motivational psychology models has been demonstrated, and thus, its potential to enable widespread participation of prosumers
was established.
Based on the proposed study, the following conclusions can be drawn:
• To ensure a sustainable operation of peer-to-peer trading within an energy system, prosumers need to participate contin-
uously. Hence, motivating them to participate is an important part of the design of a peer-to-peer trading scheme.
• Motivational psychology provides a number of models, which, with suitable application, has proven to be effective in
other domains for motivating people to work towards achieving particular objectives. These models can be exploited to
design a peer-to-peer trading scheme in order to ensure prosumers’ sustainable participation.
• One potential way to design peer-to-peer trading with all necessary properties of motivational psychology is to use game
theory, which can effectively capture the desired properties of different motivational models. Therefore, game theory should
be considered as a strong candidate to model peer-to-peer trading, when the participation of prosumers is a concern.
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• Motivational psychology could be an important factor to be considered while making policy for bringing peer-to-peer
energy trading into the existing electricity market. Feed-in tariff failed to show effectiveness in many countries [9]. To
avoid a similar circumstance with peer-to-peer trading, motivational psychology could play a critical role for policy design.
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